Aftermath of Andijan: The Challenge of Uzbekistan

By Dan Blau on 22 September 2006

So, I consider that in the coming two to three years, an Islamic revolution and the Islamization of Uzbekistan is unavoidable ... accompanied by bloodshed.

— Russian analyst Stanislav Belkovsky¹

Whether we focus on the goals of promoting liberty or fighting terrorism, we believe that continuing business as usual with the government of Uzbekistan has become inimical both to the interests of the United States and those of the people of Uzbekistan.

— Human Rights Watch²{/footnote}

On May 13, 2005, security services under the Interior Ministry of Uzbekistan shot into a crowd of dissidents and citizens, killing between 187 and 1,000 people in Andijan city.³ While the Uzbek Government blamed the incident on "Islamic extremists" and estimated a low number of casualties, reports of foreign news agencies and human rights organizations reported very significant loss of life, labeling the episode a "massacre," a "slaughter," and a "genocide" not of Islamists or Revolutionaries but of oppressed and poverty stricken Uzbek citizens.⁴

On the one hand, the U.S. response to the massacre was criticized by its closest allies as letting the Uzbek government off too easy. On the other hand, the U.S. did issue a public condemnation of the incident, which led the Uzbek government to close one of only two military bases the U.S. has in Central Asia. The Uzbek government ordered U.S. troops to leave the base within six months.

In light of continued and frequent human rights abuses in Uzbekistan, the U.S. Government must reevaluate its priorities and what it hopes to gain from the "considerable strategic and financial benefits"⁵ which it provides President Karimov. Is the U.S. more interested in political liberalization and religious freedom, or maintaining stability and security? Right now the people of Uzbekistan have neither.

Uzbekistan’s suddenly accommodating attitude towards the Western world in 2001, evident by newfound toleration for nongovernmental human rights and economic development organizations, and by willingness to grant the United States use of the Karshi-Khanabad air base at a bargain rental price, came out of mutual interest between both countries. The U.S. wanted to fight Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the Uzbek Government wanted to fight Al Qaeda in Uzbekistan. Karimov had tried to do one without the other for years with little success, creating more extremists due to his regime's systematic torture of political dissenters and anyone who outwardly displayed their religion. Members of Al Qaeda in Uzbekistan, known commonly as the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), but now going by the name of the Islamic Movement of Central Asia, "received financing from Osama bin Laden and train[ing] in Afghanistan."⁶.{/footnote} In 2001 it had "military bases in Afghanistan, Tajikistan, and a forward base of operations in Batken, Kyrgyzstan."⁷ The IMU is also involved in drug trafficking between Afghanistan and Central Asia, a lucrative trade which finances its operations.⁸

Noting the connection between Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and the IMU is essential because the common threat of Islamic extremism is the only reason why the Uzbek Government agreed to house American troops in its territory. As S. Frederick Starr, founding Chairman of the Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, has said, "We are risking American soldiers’ lives… to address a threat that hangs over [Central Asia] as much as [the United States]."⁹

For its part, the European Union responded to the Andijan violence by imposing sanctions on October 3, 2005. These sanctions "impose an embargo on exports of arms and equipment that might be used for internal repression and suspend meetings between the European Union and Uzbekistan [and] forbid the travel of Uzbek officials directly involved in the crackdown to the [European Union]."¹⁰ Yet the sanctions have been ineffective because (1) they are not being consistently enforced, and (2) the bulk of the Uzbek military equipment dates from the Soviet era, with new imports primarily coming from Russia, China, and other non-European Union nations.¹¹

The Uzbek Government has also used this foreign relations crisis as an opportunity to ramp up its repression of Western religious and other nongovernmental organizations. The American Bar Association was kicked out in April of 2006 for funding local NGOs.¹² Winrock International, which helped farmers increase grain production, was forced to leave on July 26 when Uzbek Courts found it had "denigrated national values."¹³ Central Asian Free Exchange (CAFE) was ordered to leave on July 7 for having an "unregistered logo" and lacking an "internet license."¹⁴ CAFE worked with orphans, taught English, and trained healthcare workers. Urban Institute was closed on July 12 because their officials discussed "the socioeconomic and sociopolitical situation in Uzbekistan" during a “training session for a homeowner society” thereby violating its charter. Human Rights Watch representatives are continually harassed, officially and unofficially. The Karimov regime has also liquidated local operations of Global Involvement through Education,¹⁵ Hungarian NGO Ecumenical Charity Service, Urban Institute,¹⁶ Eurasia Foundation, Freedom House, the International Research and Exchanges Board, Counterpart International, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, and the American Council for Collaboration in Education and Language Study.¹⁷

The exodus of Western investment, both monetarily and ideologically, is an obvious setback to the democratization of Uzbekistan. However, it is also important to acknowledge that Western engagement in Uzbekistan was not very effective even before the recent collapse of foreign relations. On July 25, 2006, Muhammad Salih, head of the Erk opposition party, spoke in hearings held by the Helsinki Commission.¹⁸ Salih stated that while the West cooperated with Karimov, "the democratic institutions that were created ... were always dependent on the Uzbek president’s whim. He could ban them, eliminate them at any moment — and this is what happened when the West called for an independent inquiry into the Andijan massacre." Prior to the EU’s sanctions against the Uzbek Government, during the brief period while American influence was considered significant, "the West was never able to persuade it to legalize opposition parties and to hold fair elections with participation of the opposition and independent candidates."

Meanwhile, Eastern interests have been rewarded with investment opportunities and energy supplies. The long isolated economy of Uzbekistan is integrating with new markets in Eastern and Southeastern Asia. Karimov stated as recently as May 23, 2006, that "[Uzbeks]...need to realize that our agreements to deepen friendly, mutual cooperation with such great nations as China, South Korea, India, and Pakistan represent major steps on Uzbekistan’s path toward stability and progress."¹⁹ These states are equally supportive of the Uzbek Government's version of the Andijan incident. Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesman Kong Quan referred to the massacre as an “internal affair" and expressed support for "the government crackdown on separatists, terrorists, and extremists."²⁰ A visit to South Korea got Karimov a memorandum of understanding for South Korea's National Oil Corporation and Korea Gas Corporation "to explore and possibly develop two oil and two gas fields in Uzbekistan." Karimov also visited Pakistan, for the first time in 14 years, and expressed his support for its membership in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a momentous shift in foreign policy considering Pakistan's history of supporting Taliban activities.²¹

India too has responded to the Uzbek Government's overtures. The Indian ambassador to Uzbekistan, Skand R Tayal, deflected Western criticism of the Uzbek government, stating that "international terrorism [is] one of the most serious threats to international peace and security."²² On April 25-26, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh came to Uzbekistan, the first time he had done so since taking office, and met with president Karimov. The two leaders issued a joint statement in which seven agreements aimed at greater economic cooperation were signed. Karimov announced that "Indian companies [can] explore the resource of gas, oil, and other hydrocarbons."²³ In addition, India agreed to continue "coordinating their anti-terrorist efforts" with Karimov, while the Uzbek government stated its support for India’s membership in the UN Security Council and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization.²⁴

Conclusion

Arizona Senator John McCain believes that the U.S. should at least catch up to the Europeans when it comes to putting some heat on Uzbekistan: "As Americans, we cannot stand silent in the face of such abuses.... The European Union has not remained silent.... [It has imposed] an arms embargo on Uzbekistan and a ban on visas for officials responsible for the massacre. We should do at least as much."²⁵ The problem is, "doing at least as much" as the Europeans will achieve nothing because what the Europeans are doing lacks the strength and integrity to be relevant.²⁶

There are no simple answers and no guarantees of success, but the U.S. Government should use the tools at its disposal, starting with the designation of Uzbekistan as a "Country of Particular Concern" for its human rights abuses. (CPC designation provides a statutory foundation for possible sanctions.) The U.S. should also begin an international investigation of the Andijan events, with or without the Uzbek government's consent. Such an investigation should be even-handed and follow the evidence wherever it leads, even if it means a partial exoneration of the Uzbek government.

Confrontational tactics toward Uzbekistan are not the long-term answer, engagement is. But engagement only works after an environment of trust and truth-telling has been cultivated — and some difficult spadework remains to be done before this will be a reality.

Last updated 12 January 2009