Turning the Corner in Cuba

By Matt Larson on 30 September 2005

On July 28, the State Department announced the creation of a new post, designating Caleb McCarry, a former staffer for the House International Relations Committee, as “Cuba transition coordinator.” Secretary Rice declared that McCarry’s role would be to “accelerate the demise of Castro’s tyranny” on the island which he has ruled since 1959, a goal that the Bush administration has pursued through a progressive tightening of economic sanctions and travel restrictions.¹ McCarry’s appointment represents the latest round of the 45-year standoff that has marked US-Cuban relations, a battle in which each side has erected a fortress of ideology that makes progress difficult.

The US approach has been predicated on the assumption that economic isolation will lead to the downfall of the Castro regime. During the Cold War, this policy was based largely on realpolitik, as part of the US grand strategy of containing Communism. As such, a Soviet satellite 90 miles off the coast of Florida was indeed a serious matter of national security. Post-1991, however, Cuba’s status as a strategic threat has eroded, and the promotion of democracy and human rights has become the stated aim of US policy. These are worthy goals, and the Cuban people deserve the same freedoms as their northern neighbor. But 45 years of US isolation has yielded precious little in the way of results. It is time to reassess US policy toward Cuba, both for the sake of US interests and for the sake of the Cuban people.

Tightening the Noose

One year ago, in June of 2004, the Bush administration strongly reiterated its stance on Cuba by further restricting travel to the island and by limiting remittances from exiles to their families back in Cuba (which are a major source of income for many Cubans, totaling nearly $1 billion per year). Cuban-Americans are now allowed to visit their families only once every three years, and they can take no more than $50 per day with them. Some analysts saw this move as a play to the older, hard-line exiles in Miami who would be likely to vote in the November election. However, the restrictive measures actually fostered a split within the exile community. Many who had previously supported tight sanctions spoke out against the new policy, stating that it would do more harm than good for their families on the island.

The remittances are indeed vitally important to many Cuban families, but some within the administration see them as a prop for Castro. President Bush stated that the new measures “will prevent the regime from exploiting hard currency of tourists and of remittances to Cubans.”² It may be true that the regime benefits to a certain extent from the remittances, but it cannot be denied that they are also lifelines of support for average Cubans, who struggle to make ends meet in an economy where doctors make the equivalent of $25 USD per month.

Congress has shown little desire to back down from the new restrictions. The latest missed opportunity was on June 30, 2005, when legislators defeated three amendments that would have taken a significant bite out of the embargo. The vote to ease restrictions on travel for family members was the closest, being defeated by a 211 to 208 margin. A proposal to allow more student travel was also defeated 233-187, and a measure to completely lift the trade embargo failed by a 250-169 margin. Both the House and Senate appropriations bills contain provisions that make it easier for US farmers to be paid for agricultural sales to Cuba, but President Bush has threatened a veto on such legislation.

On the Ropes?

For years, hard-liners in both the US government and in the exile community have given the impression that Castro’s regime is on the verge of collapse, needing one more restriction to finally push it over the brink. In 1996, upon the passing of legislation to tighten sanctions against Cuba (known as the Helms-Burton bill, after its co-sponsors), Republican representative Dan Burton predicted optimistically that “in a few short years, there will be freedom, democracy and human rights in Cuba, and we’ll all go down there and have a good time.”³ His counterpart, Senator Helms, stated in 1995: 

Clearly his regime is showing signs of strain, which is why now is the time to tighten the screws on Castro, not loosen them. If we keep the pressure on, if we stand firm, we can ensure that Cuba joins the free world before the turn of the millennium. The guy is on the ropes and nobody who truly believes in liberty should bail him out.⁴

A decade later, however, Castro maintains his iron grip on political power. The now 79-year old dictator (who celebrated his birthday on August 15) is as defiant as ever, ranting against the US in his trademark seven-hour speeches (although they occur with less frequency in recent years). Rumors swirled about Castro’s failing health after a fall in October of 2004, but he has appeared relatively healthy in recent public appearances. Indeed, his personal physician reassured the world that “El Caballo” would live to be 140.⁵

The “Special Period” Ends

The optimism about Castro’s downfall was probably most warranted immediately following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, which had been responsible for massive subsidies to the Cuban economy. However, Castro was able to weather the storm by instituting limited market reforms, including the acceptance of dollars as legal currency and an easing of restrictions on self-employed entrepreneurs. Although this “special period” witnessed an economic recovery by the end of the 1990s, Castro continually threatened that the liberalizing measures were not to be permanent.

In October 2004, he finally started to make good on those threats. The first step in this reassertion of control was the announcement that dollars would no longer be accepted as legal tender. Cubans were given three weeks to swap their dollars for convertible pesos, resulting in a huge influx of capital. This “de-dollarization” was accompanied by a crackdown on the other beneficiaries of the “special period” reforms: the self-employed. The government revoked the licenses of 2,000 cuentapropistas in June of 2005.

Despite rumblings about infrastructure problems in the wake of Hurricane Dennis, there are few reasons to believe that Castro’s control over Cuban society is weakening. His economy has benefited significantly from tight relationships with China and Venezuela (home of Hugo Chavez, one of Latin America’s most strident Castrophiles). He also managed to organize 1 million people on May 18, 2005 for a protest march past the US Interests Section in Havana.⁶ Castro continues to capitalize on his brand of anti-Americanism and defiant nationalism, sentiments that are often fueled by the “blockade” imposed by the US.

Reassessing US Policy

The picture, then, of the current state of US-Cuba relations is one in which ideology has triumphed over pragmatism, and the resulting policy decisions serve neither US interests nor Cuban society. There are few black-and-white solutions, but it is clear that the current strategy has accomplished very little in the way of economic liberalization or political reform.

Given the current mood in Congress, any changes will likely have to be gradual. An immediate and complete withdrawal of the embargo is neither politically desirable nor is it likely to occur, but this does not mean that measures should not be taken to progressively bring an end to the economic isolation. Proponents of sanctions argue that lifting them would afford Castro a political victory. But, as Philip Peters argues, to let Castro dictate American policy is to afford him too much credit: “To place Castro at the center of American decisions is to elevate him, giving him a steady claim on the world’s attention when—bereft of youth, resources, allies, and historical enemies—he would otherwise have very little.”⁷ Relaxing sanctions would also have tangible economic benefits for citizens in both nations. Allowing more food exports would benefit both American farmers and Cubans who are forced to subsist on the meager rations allowed by the libreta (the government-issued ration card).

The U.S. should also give serious and immediate consideration to lifting the travel ban. Not only would this change be easier to achieve politically than lifting trade sanctions, it would also be more effective in encouraging engagement over isolation. This idea has already found supporters within the exile community, including the Cuban-American National Foundation. Despite claims that increased tourism would only fill the coffers of the regime, allowing people-to-people interaction will help to ensure that resources get into the hands of those that need them. Tourists who see nothing outside of their resort enclave at Varadero (a beach where ordinary Cubans are not allowed) may not help in this capacity, but there are significant numbers of visitors who spend time in the cities, interacting with citizens and buying goods from self-employed workers.⁸

In addition to the physical dimension, lifting the travel ban will also pave the way for a much-needed exchange of dialogue and ideas between Americans and Cubans. This relationship has been clouded by the politics and posturing on both sides of the Strait of Florida. Fostering personal interaction could help take some of the bite out of Castro’s anti-American rhetoric.

Finally, in terms of promoting democracy in Cuba, less may be more. Cuba’s fledgling civil society may be hurt more than it is helped by active US involvement, as evidenced by a series of democratic protests in May of 2005. According to The Economist, “The assembly brought together the hard-line elements in the opposition. They did their best to live up to the Cuban leader's claim that all dissidents are pro-American “mercenaries.’”⁹ Oswaldo Paya, one of Cuba’s most prominent dissidents, argued that the regime would use American involvement as propaganda to attack the whole of the opposition movement.

Churches in particular have been affected by the US government’s vocal commitment to regime change. On July 1, 2004, the Bush administration released a report by the State Department’s Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba, in which it promises support for church groups that play a role in Cuba’s transition to democracy. Church leaders have expressed concerns over this policy, saying that it could jeopardize their work in and travel to Cuba by making them seem to be direct agents of U.S. policy.¹⁰

The theory behind the administration policy is solid, and it is certain that most of the church leaders would like to see democracy and freedom take root in Cuba. But accepting US government funds, even for humanitarian purposes, immediately raises a red flag with the regime. The concern is that all religious groups could come under suspicion as being subversive. For this reason, some Catholic universities have been hesitant to accept money from USAID for people-to-people programs.¹¹ If these groups are to accept funds, it will need to be much more of a back-channel process than it is currently; the money could help, as long as it is funneled through a different source.

The bottom line is that the US needs a more nuanced policy toward Cuba. However, we must not harbor false optimism about the possibilities for real change as long as Castro is in power. As Richard Nuccio has argued, “No one should be under the illusion that the United States, Canada, the European Union, the Pope, or the Spanish King can persuade Castro to champion reforms anew.”¹² Nor can the United States impose a democratic transition on Cuba. Ultimately, in the words of Oswaldo Paya, “Any transition in Cuba is for Cubans to define, lead, organize and co-ordinate.”¹³

An engagement-oriented approach to contemporary Cuba is not the same as “going soft” on Fidel Castro. Increasing numbers of Americans — including this author — have seen firsthand the extent of repression in Cuba, the appalling lack of freedom, and the struggle that is daily life in a failing economic system. However, the realistic path to minimizing the suffering of the Cuban people is via relaxing the embargo and pursuing dialogue instead of hostility. An open flow of people and ideas will contribute greatly to this mission, bringing about measures of success that will help lay the groundwork for cooperation in the post-Castro era.

Last updated 12 January 2009