Untying the Iranian Knot

By Matt Vinson on 19 May 2006

“Israel must be wiped off the map.”¹

Such is the message of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, current President of Iran. And while it is common knowledge that Ahmadinejad seeks nuclear power, it is perhaps less well known that Iran’s official brand of Islam, Twelver Shi‘ism, greatly values martyrdom and self-sacrifice — qualities that could possibly encourage an apocalypse-minded hardliner to actually use a nuclear weapon.

Iran’s militancy and belligerence have led to increased saber-rattling in America. Yet there are voices of restraint as well, including Senator Richard Lugar (R IN), chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who recently stated that “We need to make more headway diplomatically” before implementing sanctions.² What is going on here? Is diplomatic headway actually a possibility?It’s a complicated question, but the best place to begin is with an investigation of Iranian identity. This investigation, in turn, may provide a way to untie the Gordian Knot of Iranian politics. The stakes couldn’t be higher — particularly now that this knot radiates with a core of Iran’s enriched Uranium.

Iranian Politics: The Recent Strands

The myriad forces wending through Iran’s political realm today are somewhat difficult to trace, composing a tangle of highly nuanced “reformist” and “conservative” political voices. These voices can be classified as roughly pro-democracy/personal freedom and Islamic “fundamentalist” respectively, though the categorizations quickly break down. This basic contrast is useful for a broad overview.

Investigating this tangle therefore quickly focuses in on the tension between democratic ideals and Islamic principles as structured within the government. The governmental structure can be traced back to the Constitution of the Islamic Republic (approved by referendum in 1979, amended in 1989). To understand current Iranian political debate, then, one must understand a bit about the Iranian Constitution.

The constitution emerged from the Islamic revolution, and the revolution was a response to the increasing secularization mandated by Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The Shah, envisioning a renewed Persian Empire (a vision still popular today), sought the power displayed by modern nations. But in pursuing this power, he marginalized Islam. He emphasized instead the greatness of Persia’s past, drawing on such lofty figures as Cyrus the Great (Cyrus II), the Achaemenid (Persian) ruler referenced in Isaiah 45. Among other things, the Shah declared himself Shahanshah, “King of Kings,” and mandated western-style clothing even as he loosened social restrictions. He shaped himself into a secular emperor.

The revolution, comprising myriad forces against the Shah, ultimately resulted in the resurgence of Islamic influence within governance. The constitution was formulated in 1979 and was based loosely on that of the French Fifth Republic. However, the constitution seeks to establish a democratic system under the aegis of God. That is, western notions of popular sovereignty are placed within the context of the Islamic ummah, the Islamic community writ large, which means the people as a whole submit to God.

The theory, based largely on Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s concept of velayat-e faqih (“guardianship of the jurist”), is that the entire democratic system is kept faithful to Islamic principles through the oversight of the Supreme Leader. Due to this lofty role, in some respects the Supreme Leader has more power to shape and guide Iran than did the Shah. One can perhaps see the problem: practically, this means the Islamic Republic is headed by what amounts to two governments, one a democracy (the President and members of parliament elected through direct elections), the other a theocratic oligarchy (the Supreme Leader and a cadre of unelected clerics).

Two brief examples will suffice to show how this plays out politically. The first example is the Presidency of Ahmedinejad. The second, by way of contrast, is the Presidency of Seyyed Mohammed Khatami.

Elected Officials: The Voice of the People

Ahmedinejad and the present Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Khamenei, are followers of Khomeini (Khamenei became Supreme Leader in 1989 after Khomeini’s death). That is, both Ahmedinejad and Khamenei are staunch Islamic conservatives. In addition, conservative members have dominated the Majlis (Iran’s parliament) since elections in 2004, which means that the president, the Supreme Leader, and the Majlis are all aligned. Of course, the judiciary, the third branch of Iran’s government, is “conservative” as well; under Iran’s Constitution only a Shia cleric can be a judge, and these judges answer to the Supreme Leader. The current president, then, has a fair amount of power.

On the other hand, President Khatami (president 1997-2005) was elected and reelected on a reform platform, holding the office for the maximum term of eight years. His platform often put him at odds with the Supreme Leader and the judiciary, resulting in great friction and heated debate. However, Khatami was elected by huge margins, receiving roughly 70% of the vote with excellent voter turnout, therefore possessing wide support among the people.³ The Majlis elections likewise yielded reformist victories, seen as a sign of great hope by many Western nations.

The question that emerges, then, is this: How exactly did the nation move from a staunch reformist president to one who is a staunch conservative? What changed, and why? Further, what should the United States and other outsiders make of that shift?

Here the “two governments” come into play. Khatami was elected by a landslide, revealing a popular desire for reform. But because of authoritarian clerical control, many Iranians simply became apathetic to politics over the course of Khatami’s term, realizing that reform from within the system would take many years if it happened at all. And with Iran’s recent history of turmoil and upheaval, the idea of another revolution was not palatable.

Voter apathy was reinforced by the 2004 parliamentary elections. The Guardians Council, responsible for candidate approval in both parliamentary and presidential elections and heavily conservative, rejected some 3,600 of the 8,200 parliamentary applicants (though they eventually reinstated 1,160 of these), and rejected 87 incumbents.⁴ Following this maneuver, voter turnout for the 2005 presidential election was minimal. If your candidate isn’t even allowed a chance to run, why vote at all? Or worse, if your elected candidate will be thwarted at every turn by unelected clerics, why care about elections?

The government claimed that 50-60% of eligible voters participated in the 2005 election, and thereby granted it legitimacy. However, it is widely speculated that the figure is probably closer to 30 or 35%, perhaps as low as 10-15% in Tehran.⁵ Low voter turnout combined with clerical oversight at polling stations and voter fraud make the paradox of Ahmadinejad’s meager popularity and his election understandable.

Demographics and Motivations: The Core of the Knot

Apathetic as they may be, who are these reform-minded Iranians? If indeed there are so many, are they a possible leveraging force in the current nuclear crisis?

An analysis of the election leading to Khatami’s victory reveals a very strong youth and female voter turnout, both groups mobilized by Khatami’s reform promises. These two overlapping demographics are perhaps the most reform-minded groups in the country. For the purposes here, the youth especially deserve a closer look.

Iran is a youthful nation. Nearly two-fifths of Iran’s 69 million people are under the age of 15, and the median age is a bit under 25. Approximately 70% of the people are in their early 30s or younger.⁶

A growing number of people live in cities, notably Tehran and Esfahan, and, despite clerical control, those aspects of modernization attendant to city living — hip-hop/rap, homemade vodka, cell phones, satellite television, designer hijab — are on the rise. This phenomenon has been described by some Iranian parliament members as “westoxification,” and is deeply resisted by the clerics and their volunteer police squads, the Basij. But it is happening all the same.

To be sure, even if the youth of Iran love things western and despise corrupt clerical control, this does not necessarily mean they love the United States or western nations. The younger generations are more likely to seek the greatness of Persia over unity with America.

Given the United States' posture toward India, and given that many of Iran’s neighbors have nuclear weapons, quite a few Iranians see nuclear power as necessary for defense purposes. More to the point, many see development of a nuclear weapon as an integral component of upholding Persian pride. It seems starkly hypocritical for the nuclear-powered nations to bar Iran from the nuclear club. The Iranian youth may hate clerical dictators, but they also know Ahmadinejad wants a strong Persia, and here their aspirations can align.

A Way Forward: Untying the Knot with Youthful, Iranian Hands

Persian nationalist pride is not necessarily a bad thing. Yet, it is not for nothing that the United States is concerned with Iran’s desire to possess nuclear technology. The Iranian government, for instance, recently sought and obtained long-distance ballistic missile technology capable of carrying a nuclear warhead.⁷ Further, Ahmadinejad and other high-profile government members such as Iranian Defence Minister Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar have made it clear that Iran will not hesitate to arm itself against its enemies.

Iran is not exactly an upstanding “world citizen.” In addition to its role in proliferation and sponsorship of terrorists, Iran has a well-known record of human rights abuses (notably with regard to freedom of speech/press and personal liberties), as documented by Amnesty International among others.⁸ This record is not helped by the fact that Ahmadinejad was an executioner at the notorious Evin Prison⁹ following the ’79 revolution. Ahmadinejad’s virulent anti-Israel stance, perhaps popular with some Iranians, has not helped matters, either.

However, given the current deployment of U.S. troops, the Iranian government knows threats of military action are not likely to be carried out. Even if action were to be taken, Iran is not Iraq: Iran’s nuclear sites are spread across the country and are deeply buried to prevent bombing.¹⁰ Diplomacy, then, is the way forward, and must be a delicate operation of persuasion. If an overly harsh diplomatic line is taken, it may cause the Iranian government to clamp down on internal “dissension”; overt external pressure could merely play into the hands of the Iranian government hardliners, giving them an opportunity to seize even greater control in the name of national interest.

There are things the United States can do. The first is to remember that a harsh line against Ahmadinejad may also be interpreted as a harsh line against the youth. In addition, if diplomacy with Ahmadinejad proves successful, it is not likely anyone will accuse him of being a sellout to America. Second, policy makers and Americans generally must learn the importance of faith (notably Shi‘ism) to the Iranian people. This involves not a mere respect, but a measured study of and interest in Islam and what Muslims believe. Third, it is clear that Iran wants control over the Shi‘ite population of Iraq. Though any deal encompassing Iran and Iraq would be delicate, it might be worth considering how to turn this matter into a bargaining chip. Fourth, the United States will necessarily have to work with the EU, with Russia, and with China in order to make multilateral negotiations effective. Fifth, democracy-minded organizations within Iran can be funded with increasing support. Along similar lines, Persian pride can be identified as a positive good, and constructive expressions of this historical pride can be encouraged.

All this, of course, constitutes a long-term approach, and is based on the hope that the future of Iran will bear a different sort of face than the one it currently presents. It may be hoped that, in the hands of the youth, Iran will achieve its desired glory, manifesting modern and peaceful expression of the best of the Persian Empire and Shia Islam.

Last updated 12 January 2009