The Sino-Japanese Paradox: Implications for US Engagement

By Amanda Grier on 06 January 2006

While Americans have lately been fretting over the future of bilateral relations between the US and China (e.g., issues such as Chinese attempts to purchase US companies), they have paid regrettably little attention to changes in the economic and security relationship between China and Japan, a crucial US ally in the region. For instance, last year, China surpassed the US as Japan’s largest trading partner. Although it will be some time before China becomes the dominant player in a region where the dollar has been king for decades, it seems as if China is potentially poised to challenge the regional strategic status quo. US government and non-governmental actors alike should calibrate their actions carefully, and not underestimate the importance and the challenge of maintaining close relations with Japan while at the same time preserving regional stability.

At the heart of the challenge is this paradox: relations between Japan and China are becoming more interdependent and more prone to conflict at the same time. Japan views China as both a vital economic friend and a real security threat. China, along with North Korea, was identified as a possible security threat in the 2004 Japanese National Defense Program Outline.¹ Furthermore, increasing anti-Japanese nationalism in China has strained diplomatic relations between China and Japan over the past year.

The Sino-Japanese relationship is ancient and complex, with a lot of scores to settle. During imperialist Japan’s invasion of China, Japanese solders raped, pillaged, and killed hundreds of thousands of Chinese civilians. Needless to say, when Chinese soccer fans exploded into violence last year after the Japanese victory at the Asian Cup final, it was not about soccer. Despite the Chinese government’s repeated efforts to calm nationalist animosity towards Japan, flare-ups have become common in the last couple of years. This April, anti-Japanese protests erupted in cities all over China, calling for a boycott of Japanese goods and the denial of Japan’s bid for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council.

When in 1995 Japanese Prime Minister Tomichi Murayama offered a formal apology for imperialist Japan’s crimes, China at first seemed to accept it — but has since ignored Japan’s repeated apologies, and most Chinese now believe there never was one. Assistant Press Secretary at the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Akira Chiba, argues that the Japanese people are tired of being China’s “eternal scapegoat.”² Pragmatic Japan has moved past its imperialistic history and finds it difficult to understand China’s sensitive feelings. China, on the other hand, has a long memory.

Another sore spot is the fact that the Japanese government has kept unofficial ties to Taiwan. Any escalation of Taiwan’s conflict with China could quickly ensnarl Japan. Japanese political and business leaders make frequent visits to Taiwan, and Japan maintains a de-facto embassy in Taipei. Japan’s issuance of a tourist visa to Lee Teng-hui despite China’s loud complaint did not help to support the One China policy. Taiwan’s culture and political ideology are closely matched to Japan’s, while China’s brand of authoritarian communism is repulsive to Japan’s democratic and capitalist core values. Japan’s sympathies with Taiwan’s democratic struggle and its opposition to the One China policy make Japan a natural, albeit cautious, ally of Taiwan. If the issue of Taiwan escalates militarily, it would pull Japan and the US into a war with China — a war that no one can afford.

Yet despite such tensions in the Sino-Japanese diplomatic relationship, the economic relationship has been strengthening. A substantial rise in Japanese exports to China in the past three years has helped bolster a Japanese economic turnaround. Likewise, China has benefited from generous Japanese investment. The deepening economic interdependence has eased some of the diplomatic tensions. Prime Minister Koizumi decided not to visit the controversial Yasukuni war shrine, where Class A Japanese war criminals are enshrined, on New Years in 2005. Pointing to China’s refusal to receive Japanese high level officials until the Koizumi stops visiting Yasukuni, most observers agree that Koizumi’s move was in recognition of China’s economic importance to Japan. There is also hope that Japan and China will establish a free trade agreement that would increase Japan’s GDP.

As of now, a healthy economic relationship has mitigated the unresolved historical tensions between these rivals. However, the stability of the overall relationship is increasingly precarious. In many ways, the Japan-US friendship has added fuel to the fire. Asians, particularly Chinese and South Koreans, are becoming increasingly critical of US foreign policy which they see as unilateralist and unnecessarily hawkish, especially with regards to North Korea. As Japan frequently defers to the United States on defense issues, Koizumi is likened by many Chinese as President Bush’s obedient dog. Whereas the US and Japan have been moving toward unilateralism, China has been recently pursuing a multilateral engagement strategy with its neighbors in the Pacific. For example, China hosted six-party talks with North Korea and proposed joint military exercises with South East Asian countries.

The uncharacteristic tunnel vision and unilateralism of recent US foreign policy has made the United States increasingly unpopular and undermined the economic and diplomatic strength of one of our closest allies. The risk is the possible loss of the United States’ historical foothold in Northeast Asia, a region that provides the economic stability and potential to keep the US an economic superpower abroad and a wealthy nation at home.

US engagement in the region needs to make sincere and public efforts at multilateralism, especially with regards to North Korea. Many countries in the region have been reaching out to North Korea, especially China and South Korea, in an effort to normalize relations and diminish the threat of nuclear proliferation. The Bush administration has been undermining this effort by closing doors of compromise with inflammatory language and ultimatums. The benefits of a congenial US-China relationship are obvious. And if China and Japan can work together, they are best equipped to keep the Taiwan and North Korea security threats from escalating into war.

In conclusion, the United States must better understand the changing Japanese-Sino relationship both economically and diplomatically. This includes the inter-relatedness of the two sides of the paradox as well as the United States’ own role in the relationship.

Last updated 12 January 2009