Transforming National Security: The 9/11 Imperative

By Dr. Chris Seiple on 17 September 2004

Three years, two wars and two political conventions later, we finally seem to be coming to grips with the national security implications of Sept. 11. Ideas have been suggested, mantles claimed, and promises made. Lately, debate rages over reforming the intelligence community. While such an effort is important, it is irrelevant unless we simultaneously transform our entire national security establishment. Piecemeal change will only make the situation worse.

During her appearance before the 9/11 Commission, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice named the painfully obvious problem. "The inability to connect the dots was really structural," she said. Although a 20th-century security structure for a 21st-century fight is the cause of our problems — imagine fighting the Korean War with the same structure we fought the Spanish-American War — it is easier to focus on such symptoms as intelligence.

We need a "revolution in national security affairs" to create a national security establishment — from people to organizations to congressional oversight committees — that is as nimble as the enemy we face. Fortunately, our military provides an example of the required transformation through its own "revolution in military affairs." The military revolution has been under way since Vietnam and has accelerated with the rapid advance of information technology. It includes developing more lethal and accurate weapons, but its essence is forming an expeditionary organization that adjusts to the threat environment as it is, not as we would like it to be.

The sine qua non of the revolution in military affairs came in 1986, when Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols Act — against the will of the military — forcing the armed services to work together. Today, joint task forces, assignments to other services (required for promotion) and, above all else, joint education, are the norm. Goldwater-Nichols created nothing less than a new military culture and mindset that transcended service identity.

For example, my own initial joint education came at the Naval Postgraduate School where, as a Marine, I took classes with Navy, Army and Air Force personnel. We didn't lose our different institutional identities, but stereotypes that might have prevented coordination in the field disappeared in the classroom. Over a generation, military students cannot help but come away with a great respect for each other and a common understanding of the security environment and its unforgiving demand for joint military action.

However, a revolution in military affairs without a concurrent effort in the national security arena simply makes us more vulnerable. In Iraq, the conventional military victory validated the military overhaul, while the aftermath has confirmed the need for a revolution in national security affairs.

Throughout the American-led occupation, the Coalition Provisional Authority was not readily present throughout the country, often leaving its responsibility of reconstruction and other civic functions to the military. As the Marines prepared to go back to Iraq last March, I was asked to help develop indicators by which the force could measure success. It was amazing how many nonmilitary considerations had to be addressed — from the state of electrical grids to unemployment rates — simply because if the Marines didn't deal with them, it wasn't clear who would. (It is encouraging to note that Secretary of State Colin Powell recently established an Office of the Coordinator for Stabilization and Reconstruction; how it is funded and staffed will determine its relevance).

Inevitably one wonders what might have happened in Iraq, or on 9/11, for that matter, if the other agencies relevant to national security had been, like the military, forced to undergo an intensive and intentional transformation of culture and mindset for the last 18 years. One wonders what will happen in the next 18 years if they do not do so now. Still, despite some solid efforts within various agencies, individual agency transformations are not enough. We need a national security revolution that addresses the structural whole, not just the piecemeal parts.

That revolution requires three commitments from our leaders. First, they cannot be afraid to begin with a blank slate, building a comprehensive structure that is relevant to the world we live in today, not the threat we faced or the organizations we inherited from yesterday.

Second, Congress must tackle the problem with the same aggressiveness as they did in addressing the military's reluctance to change during the Goldwater-Nichols debates. Members of Congress must also be aggressive with themselves, ready and willing to change the structure of oversight and appropriations committees. If they do not, they will remain a part of the problem.

Third, and most importantly, a Goldwater-Nichols Act for the national security establishment must require employees to train and be educated together. As a common understanding of our security environment emerges in this process, stereotypes will break down. Over time, a common operational interagency culture will result that will prevent catastrophes because senior officials in the various agencies will literally know the other agencies with whom they must coordinate.

Only then will we be ready, and stay ready. Otherwise, we will continue to be attacked, and commissions will continue to urge us to change our ways.

Last updated 12 January 2009