The Grand Strategy: Sustainment

By Dr. Chris Seiple on 25 April 2003

Notwithstanding numerous mistakes along the way, America has made one big and solidifying contribution to the history of the world: freedom. Last century, the United States got freedom right as it proved decisive in winning World War I, World War II and the Cold War. With 9/11, however, came a turning point in American history, a fundamental recalibration of the American role in the world. The liberation of Iraq, an outgrowth of that reconsideration, is a watershed for the world system. American actions on the international and Iraqi stage will establish new patterns of global relations. If America is to continue to bear the banner of freedom into this new century, it must possess a grand strategy — sustainment.

Grand strategy, as Paul Kennedy notes, is "the capacity of the nation's leaders to bring together all of the elements [of power], both military and nonmilitary, for the preservation and enhancement of the nation's long-term (that is, in wartime and peacetime) best interests." Grand strategy requires well-defined policy goals, interim objectives, and measures of effectiveness for each of the elements of power applied, of which the military is but one. It requires that we wage peace with the same resolve and urgency with which we make war.

The United States and its allies fought the war in Iraq for two political objectives: to remove and restore. The envisioned peace is the removal of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) as a threat to global security and the restoration of Iraq to its citizens as a responsible member of the international community. With the controlled implosion of the Hussein regime in but three weeks time, achieved through a daring military strategy, the United States is now politically positioned to achieve these objectives. To create the peace we desire, however, we must possess a consistent grand strategy that facilitates and applies the elements of national and international power in order to sustain freedom in an appropriate manner.

Unfortunately, the details of peace are less riveting than the dangers of war and there is always the chance that American word and deed might differ as we remove the WMD and restore Iraq. Given the current perception of America in the Middle East and around the world, it is imperative that our grand strategy is consistent in both message and methodology. If our grand strategy is to remain relevant in a fluid context, we must consider the critical mediums through which it will be implemented: 1) The international context of U.S. action in Iraq; 2) the Iraqi context of restoration; and 3) the organizational structure in Iraq to implement U.S. grand strategy.

The International Context: Building Bridges

There are three elements to this context: 1) the United Nations; 2) Europe; and 3) the Middle East. None possess a favorable perception of the U.S. and none know quite what to make about the liberation of Iraq. For its part, the U.S. has its own confusions and suspicions about these three elements, but knows that each must be included in a way that supports, for now, the territorial integrity of Iraq.

The United Nations

To paraphrase Winston Churchill on American democracy, the U.N. is the worst international forum for discussion and negotiation except for all the others. Yet, if we didn't have it, we'd have to invent it. The U.N. — despite being based on the political status quo of the post-World War II era — is the sole imprimatur of international legitimacy in our world today. There must be a role for the U.N.

That role, however, should be envisioned in the clear light of day, consistent with the U.N.'s historic capability. In truth, the U.N. has often demonstrated dangerous incompetence in handling complex political situations. Consider Srebenica where 10,000 Muslims were killed by Milosevic's forces; or Rwanda, where the machete was allowed to become a weapon of mass destruction as 800,000 died. (Both cases were under the supervision of the U.N.'s Department of Peacekeeping Operations, then headed by Kofi Annan). The U.N. should not play a central role in the restoration of Iraq, for it will only make the situation worse.

There are, however, three distinct roles for the U.N. The first is to provide its well-established expertise in relief operations. Iraq needs the short-term humanitarian expertise of the professionals at the Office of Coordination and Humanitarian Assistance, the World Food Program, UNICEF, the U.N. Development Program, and the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees. Second, the U.N. must vote to lift sanctions against Iraq so that it may begin normal trade relations with the world. As part of this resolution, the U.N. oil-for-food program (that currently has $14 billion dollars in escrow) should be turned over to Iraqi authorities as soon as possible. (This will be difficult because this program provides lucrative contracts to Russian and French firms, not to mention that it has created a self-serving bureaucracy of one thousand non-Iraqi U.N. employees). The final role concerns the discovery of WMD. There must be independent verification and worldwide coverage of the WMD that American personnel find in Iraq. U.N. inspectors should be invited to Iraq to confirm that which they could not find during the Hussein regime. To coordinate these activities in Iraq, a Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG) should be appointed.

Europe

There is no "old" and "new" Europe. There is only a question of who was liberated most recently. Today's unified Europe testifies to the fact that America can act at the intersection of its values and interests over a sustained period of time. By winning Western Europe with World War II and Eastern Europe with the Cold War, America has already proven that it liberates and returns — freely. Indeed, the American gift to the bloodiest region in human history is a whole Europe that can now entertain, if not soon embody, a Kantian peace (Immanuel Kant's 1795 treatise, "Perpetual Peace," argued that a state of peace must be "established" among nations so that states could each seek a "civil constitution" which, collectively, would result in a perpetual peace based on common values).

After much consternation between America and France, Germany, and Russia prior to the war, it is now time to move on. Prime Minister Blair, who has proved himself a genuine statesman, is the key to the renewal of transatlantic ties. Europe's alliances of shared values are the future if only because they are proven multi-partner responses to the security issues of yesterday and today. NATO and even the European Union are not only models of what can happen regionally when rule-of-law institutions take root; they are also practical means for sustaining a global order of freedom. Even in a unipolar era, Americans need the sustainability that Europe's regional organizations offer — especially in places like Afghanistan and Iraq — because the U.S. cannot do it alone. Nor is it in American interest to do so. The U.S. should be happy to share military and financial burdens with European allies. Blair is the bridge back to Europe, and it is one that Americans must walk across.

The Middle East

Regime change in Iraq has already begun scrambling the board. Syria, for instance, is now acutely aware that it cannot brazenly continue its occupation of Lebanon, sponsorship of terrorism, and possession of WMD. Syria will adjust. In Turkey, we should be thankful that a northern front did not materialize. Bloodshed was prevented because Turkish troops have largely been kept out of the autonomous Kurdish region in Northern Iraq. More importantly, in the long-term, we need to applaud the fact that the Turkish parliament said "no." In the past, the Turkish military would have exercised its influence and dismissed the government. Turkey is becoming a real democracy and we should prudently encourage that process.

In Iran the (theocratic) Politburo respects force. They will proceed with caution. While Iran is controlled by a small group of clerics that sponsors terrorism, most Iranians seek some kind of representative government. Iranians will soon find a way to throw off their yoke and America must be ready to encourage opposition groups. Finally, Saudi Arabia, as with Egypt, is now coming to grips with the ironic fact that a Hussein dominated Iraq was better for their own longevity. Ideas have consequences and freedom has a way of permeating repressive regimes. These regimes are now much closer to their demise than ever before.

In this context, American grand strategy should be grounded in an ongoing public diplomacy campaign that addresses the general Arab feeling of helplessness and humiliation, a feeling that the liberation of Iraq has ironically fed. We can be unabashed about our values but we must be extremely sensitive in the methodologies we use to advance them. More specifically, we must demonstrate principled consistency in our efforts to help resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Like it or not, most Arabs will first view American credibility in Iraq through the prism of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. And, like it or not, America is perceived as one-sided. President Bush's "roadmap" for peace between Israel and Palestine should be presented and discussed in a clear and balanced manner, and pursued with alacrity and vigor. Incremental results must build toward tangible markers of progress. This process will require tremendous political capital applied in exacting detail, even as we approach an election year. It will also take great personal courage. Only President Bush can provide this leadership, as he has done in the war on terror and against the Hussein regime.

Again, the key to operating amidst this complexity is a message of freedom backed by a methodology that the peoples of the world perceive as consistent with the message. The task of communicating the message effectively begins with al-Jazeera. This network should be given as much access as it wants to cover the restoration of Iraq. We must remember that al-Jazeera did not even exist during the first Gulf War. Although it is going through its own period of "yellow journalism," the good news is that al-Jazeera can grow into a force for freedom that by-passes the authoritarian regimes of the region, reporting directly to ordinary people on the street. The U.S. can help that process by being completely transparent in Iraq.

Americans should not expect a Democratic domino theory to immediately cascade across the region. It will take place sooner rather than later, however, if the U.S. takes strong, subtle, and sustained action on Palestine and in Iraq. And while Palestine is the prism, it will be in Iraq that we demonstrate freedom today so that the region can choose freedom tomorrow.

The Iraqi Context: The Three "R's" of Restoration

Restoration is rooted in a secure environment. The military's job in this context is twofold. First, it is to conduct security and stability operations (e.g., checkpoints, city patrols, and the search for WMD). Second, it is to help the helper — i.e., to enable marginal self-sufficiency in Iraq by allowing the experts from the other elements of national and international power (humanitarian, economic, judicial, educational, etc.) to work with Iraqis in restoring their country. Three components shape our analysis as we discern which elements of national and international power should be brought to bear, and when: 1) Relief; 2) Religion; and 3) Rule-of-Law.

Relief

This dimension is initially paramount, involving anything that provides basic dignity to individual human beings through access to food, shelter, and clothing. This phase also includes the establishment of well-stocked hospitals and the return of refugees from Iran and Jordan (from before the war) as well as the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs). Relief begins with the provision of food and ensuring that potable water is available (the spread of cholera through dirty water remains a constant threat). In this case, immediate relief also includes the consistent provision of electricity and sanitation (garbage and sewage removal). In a country where 70% of the people live in urban areas, these needs are more integral to basic dignity than a traditional (rural) relief effort. The experts in this field are the U.N. and humanitarian non-governmental organizations (NGOs). If done right, the provision of relief engenders good will and, in turn, patience with the longer and more complex tasks associated with establishing the rule-of-law.

Religion

Since the Enlightenment, we in the West have separated church and state in the name of good governance — with good reason, and with generally good results. The casualty, however, has often been analysis.

In short, we Westerners should begin our analysis of the religious factor in Iraq with two acknowledgements. First, religion is a legitimate realpolitik issue for grand strategy consideration (if only because many Arabs associate Christianity with imperialism). Consider the example of Samaritan's Purse, a Christian relief organization run by Franklin Graham. Graham has made derogatory comments about Islam and he gave the invocation at the inauguration of President Bush, who is open about his Christian faith. In a region where perception is reality, it does not matter that Samaritan's Purse is a good relief organization. It will be perceived as a proselytizing Trojan Horse for imperialist Christian America. Samaritan's Purse should stay out of Iraq and instead allow its supplies to be distributed by other faith-based organizations, including Muslim charities.

Second, Westerners should acknowledge that the general Islamic desire to integrate religion in public life is not inherently wrong, and that there is a tradition of respect for other faiths within Islam. Recall that the Ottoman Empire, of which Iraq was a province until the French and English provided the new state with borders in the early 1920s, allowed Christians and Jews to practice their faith freely.

Regarding religion in contemporary Iraq, American grand strategists should quickly recognize that there are no monoliths. It has become worse than cliché to sketch a tripartite religious map of Iraq — the Kurds of the North (who are Sunni Muslims of the Shafii School), the Sunni Arabs of the Center (of the Hanafi School), and the Shi'a Arabs of the South (who are mostly "Twelver's" who believe in the return of their 12th Imam).

In fact, religion is not the primary source of allegiance for most Iraqis. Beneath each convenient category — Kurds, Sunnis and Shi'a's — is a complex mosaic of tribe, clan, and blood identities that is intermixed with economic class and previous loyalties to the Bath Party. For example, Saddam Hussein co-opted some Kurdish clans to fight against their fellow Kurds. Even among anti-Hussein Kurds, internecine conflicts have occurred. Most Sunni Arabs will be against the Sunni tribes of Hussein's hometown, Tikrit. During the Iran-Iraq war, the Shi'a south chose to fight with their Iraqi Arab (Sunni) brothers to the north against their Persian (Shi'a) co-religionists from the east. In Najaf, we have already witnessed the murder of one Shi'a cleric by a rival cleric clan.

Although religion is not the primary identity of most, religion could be the critical factor in establishing a stable civil society. Religion is a sufficiently broad category to unite people, transcending different clan and economic relations. In 1999, for example, Hussein had Ayatollah Muhammad Sadiq al-Sadr and his two sons assassinated because they were building a network based on religion that transcended various allegiances (and was thus a threat to the regime). The existing religious networks of local clerics throughout Iraq could also be useful for spreading information and mobilizing the populace for civic activities.

Strategists should not think for one minute, however, that local clerics will work with any foreigners, no matter their country of origin or declared purpose, just because the foreigners ask. The inclusion of these religious networks in the restoration process is a sensitive one that will be solved on a case-by-case basis according to the religious and cultural nuance of the foreigners involved (U.S. government, international NGOs, or U.N. agencies) and the personalities of the clerics.

There are incumbent resources of reconciliation within Islam that will need to be tapped after long years of enmity between groups and, more immediately, after the inevitable reprisals that will take place. If a culturally congruent form of religious freedom can take root and grow into an environment where different faiths are tolerated, even respected, it can be the ultimate form of conflict prevention; it removes religion as the catalyst to conflict. Similarly, if there is genuine respect for someone's right to practice a faith differently, or to practice a different faith, it encourages opportunities for political and economic freedom of choice. Thomas Jefferson called religious freedom the "first freedom" because where there is freedom of conscience so too is there the freedom to speak, gather, associate, and, often, a free press. Simply put, religious freedom is the cornerstone of civil society and as such, the foundation as well for rule-of-law institutions.

Rule-of-law

Establishing rule-of-law is essentially state-building: the process of institutionalizing long-term civic habits and rational state structures. Importantly, rule-of-law is not necessarily western democracy. Rule-of-law suggests that, according to the culture and history of a country, there can be transparent laws that are applicable to everyone, ensuring impartial accountability and freedom of choice. The result is stability and decency in governance, attracting investments and the possibility of representative government. Rule-of-law is much more important than elections.

Rule-of-law in Iraq begins with the presence of a legitimate and credible force throughout the country to enforce laws. As new laws are established and a sense of routine returns to Iraq, the presence of a protective force on the streets of Iraqi cities is essential. These forces prevent looting (which, at least initially, was a political grievance mechanism for a long-repressed people) and set the physical and psychological tone that actions have consequences. Initially, this force will consist of coalition troops punctuated by Iraqi policeman that have been locally vetted. As soon as possible, however, this force must be replaced by an all-Iraqi police force that has been thoroughly trained. An all-Iraqi force has a much greater chance of achieving the sine qua non of law enforcement: perceived legitimacy.

Rule-of-law in Iraq also begins with the removal of WMD. Once these weapons are found — and they will be — they should be independently verified by the United Nations and held up as proof that, seventeen U.N. resolutions and twelve years later, the international community can act for justice. We should not forget that this war was one of punishment, not just preemption.

Concurrent with these two fundamental steps are other initiatives to develop individual and institutional accountability. Judiciary reform is critical, and it should be informed by leading Arab scholars from the region. Indeed, judges from the Arab League should be brought in to provide an outside, but accepted, source of judicial authority while Iraqi judges are vetted and/or trained.

The judicial reform's first priority is a set of laws, and a constitution, that guarantee both human rights and financial contracts (which will invite foreign investments). Related is the establishment of a new currency that Iraqis and investors find credible. These two efforts will begin to create jobs for an economically depressed but highly educated population. Education reform is needed as well, especially in a country where 45% of the population is fifteen or younger. Shaping these young minds now with culturally appropriate concepts of pride, tolerance, and respect is ultimately the most important reform.

Other important initiatives include: a tribunal for regime players who have committed crimes against humanity; the disarmament and reintegration of most of the military into civil society; the protection of the environment; and the provision of psychological assistance to those who suffered torture under the Hussein regime.

Finally, none of these efforts take place without the Iraqi people to implement them. The selection of local, regional and national Iraqis by the Iraqis themselves will depend on the answers to several crucial questions. First, how comprehensive should the purge of the previous regime's civil service be? Second, how many recently returned Iraqis should be included in the government? Third, what is the role of Islamic clerics in government?

Establishing the proper authorities will vary according to the context. As experienced in Basra recently, where the British put the "wrong" Shi'a cleric in power and then had to abruptly remove him because of a public uproar, this process will require a good deal of trial-and-error — and patience. More broadly, the process of addressing these questions will be much more successful if it is redundantly transparent, so that all the peoples of Iraq know exactly what is going on.

Organization: Implementing Grand Strategy

If the above principles and concepts shape our grand strategy, how does the rubber meet the road?

The U.S. Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance (ORHA) will oversee this process. Retired Army Lieutenant General Jay Garner leads ORHA, based in Baghdad. He reports to General Tommy Franks, the military-governor of Iraq. Also reporting to Franks is his designate, Lieutenant General McKiernan, headquartered in Baghdad. McKiernan is responsible for all military forces in Iraq. Reconstruction is not a military job, but the difficult reality is this: in terms of comprehensive presence, logistics, security, and quick decision-making, only the military can do it.

The broad outlines of a response structure have now emerged. Regarding security, General McKiernan has divided the country into three areas for the coordination of stability operations. The Army is responsible for the north of the country, overseeing nine million people in eight governates. The greater Baghdad area, or Central Region, will also "belong" to the Army, with McKiernan responsible for the five million people there. The Marines and British forces have assumed responsibility for the remaining nine governates of the south and its nine million people.

Jay Garner has divided his ORHA group by region and by sector. The Northern, Central and Southern regions (roughly analogous to the military division of the country) are each administered by a retired military or foreign service officer who reports to Garner. Also reporting to Garner are three sectors chiefs whose responsibilities transcend the three regions. These sectors include: Reconstruction (literally the rebuilding of the country); Civic Administration (establishing local authorities); and Humanitarian Assistance (relief work). An Interim Iraqi Authority (IIA) will work directly with Garner at his headquarters in Baghdad. The IIA's composition is still being decided. Soon, IIA and ORHA officials will co-lead the new ministries of government.

But what should this organization look like at the local level? Still being developed in Iraq, the best historical model we have is the British counterinsurgency effort in Malaysia (1948-1960). During this time, there was a comprehensive response structure whereby national, regional, and local committees implemented a grand strategy of security and civic action. No matter the level, each committee was made up of the relevant components of British and Malaysian power; e.g., police, military, non-governmental organizations, etc. Importantly, these committees were empowered to make decisions locally. As a result, the actual implementation of socio-economic and civic initiatives were de-politicized. If there were grievances regarding these initiatives, citizens could take them to the local standing committee as an ordinary event. Not only did this capacity to address issues locally begin to habituate the people to rule-of-law procedures, it allowed the national committee to stay focused on broader strategic considerations. Importantly, these committees were backed by a new constabulary and civil service, which, in turn, was undergirded by the presence of small groups of British troops, not overwhelming force.

In Iraq we will have to implement a similar structure country-wide. At the local level (at least down to the governates), it is imperative that the OHRA representative be collocated with the military commander. The coalition must always speak with one voice, something harder to do if there are two different Headquarters at the local level. That said, the local U.S. headquarters is not the place for Iraqis, the U.N., and humanitarian NGOs to meet with U.S. officials. There must be a separate place that facilitates that discussion. Within the U.S. headquarters, there will naturally be classified information and areas where non-U.S. personnel will not be allowed. As various case studies prove, this fact inevitably creates the impression that the U.S. has something to hide and is not sharing all of its information. Also, many international and Iraqi actors will not feel comfortable in a U.S. and/or military setting. A separate place where all stake-holders can meet to make transparent decisions about local efforts to address relief, religion, and rule-of-law activities is critical. This place should be within walking distance of the U.S. headquarters in order to facilitate better coordination and a common approach. 

Conclusion

The United States has now moved beyond the containment of communism to the sustainment of freedom in the 21st Century. It begins in Iraq. A grand strategy of sustainment synergistically harnesses all the elements of national, international, and Iraqi power in order to remove the threat of WMD to the world and to restore Iraq to its people as a responsible member of the global community. This grand strategy is formed and informed by the international and Iraqi stages upon which it must play out and according to the on-the-ground organization that implements it.

To be sure, while the destination of freedom is clear, the road there is bumpy. Fortunately, the United States has been here before. As in the last century, the U.S. will succeed in sustaining freedom; but only if Americans proceed with both the vision of the hedgehog and the nuance of the fox.

Last updated 12 January 2009