Seeing Uzbekistan: From Cliché to Clarity

By Dr. Chris Seiple on 08 January 2002

At the center of Central Asia is Uzbekistan, our new best friend in the fight against terrorism. Uzbekistan, however, is much more than the enemy of our enemy. It is quickly becoming the litmus test for American foreign policy in the 21st Century. Whether we like it or not, American policy — or a lack thereof — toward Uzbekistan will establish precedents regarding America’s global approach to security and human rights, the fight against terrorism, and the long-term stability of Central and South Asia. We do not have the luxury of getting Uzbekistan wrong.

Over the past few years I have conducted numerous interviews with Uzbek, U.S. and non-governmental organization (NGO) officials about U.S.-Uzbek relations. My overwhelming sense is that Americans use three cliches in their consideration of Uzbekistan: 1) Security; 2) Human rights; or 3) Dictatorship. Despite truth in each, this tired menu of clichés makes it difficult to get the questions right and is in need of a reality check. If not, then there is no chance for an enduring policy for Uzbekistan, let alone creating a prototype of U.S. engagement in the 21st Century.

Cliché #1.

Security matters most. This perspective recognized that by the late 1990s, Uzbekistan was facing a real national security threat, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU). Using Afghanistan as sanctuary and staging ground, the IMU infiltrated Uzbekistan during the past three summers, seeking to establish a Taliban-style government in Tashkent, the capital of Uzbekistan. (The IMU fought for bin Laden and the Taliban around Mazar-e-Sharif this past November). Accordingly, this approach tolerated the Uzbek crackdown on any threat (real or perceived) associated with bin-Laden’s Islam. One NGO leader sums up: "If you had Islamic terrorists in your country and if the Taliban was in Canada, what would you do?" But this crackdown includes the documented violation of human rights. And that is unacceptable.

Cliché #2.

Uzbekistan is a poster child for human rights violations. This view, to its credit, repeatedly points to the alleged 7,000 Uzbeks in Uzbekistan’s jails for practicing some form of Islam not condoned by the state. Uzbek officials will tell you, off-the-record, that there are real problems in their law enforcement system, especially the further one gets from Tashkent. Indeed, repression inevitably creates that which you seek to prevent — terrorists. Still, single-issue advocacy is not, and cannot, be the beginning of a sustainable policy, no matter how noble the cause.

These two clichés come to a head in the consideration of religious freedom. Human rights advocates genuinely believe that Uzbekistan should be sanctioned by the United States for religious freedom violations. In my opinion, however, faith choice is not an issue in Uzbekistan, but faith-application is. One can choose any faith in Uzbekistan, as long as that faith does not call for the overthrow of the government.

But it is also wrong-headed to tolerate the violation of human rights in the name of Uzbek national security. And so Americans must eschew an "either-or" approach based on clichés that are individually irrelevant. The proper balance comes from seeing past the third cliché that Americans use to see Uzbekistan.

Cliché #3.

The Uzbek government is a monolithic dictatorship. As such, there are no "good" Uzbek officials, President Karimov could not be popular, and every action Uzbekistan takes serves the singular purpose of maintaining his power. Although no mistake should be made about Karimov’s authority, it is foolish to think that Karimov is not appreciated by his people, or that he does not have to balance internal forces as well as competing visions for Uzbekistan’s foreign policy.

Karimov is an unusual authoritarian leader because he is preparing Uzbekistan for the future. He devotes at least 20% of the national budget to education (if only because he recognized early on the threat of madrasas that teach hate to young children in Pakistan). He has established the Umit Foundation to send young Uzbeks to do their undergraduate or graduate work in the West. Karimov has also blessed the organizational and educational transformation of the Uzbek military. I believe that Karimov is well aware of the long-term, democratic, effects of this education.

In the near-term, however, we will not see democracy as we know it. And, despite the human rights violations, history may judge this the right course. During Uzbekistan’s first ten years of independence, for example, Karimov has protected it from Tajikistan’s civil war to the east (1992-97 with 50,000 casualties), the Taliban to the south, and Turkmenistan’s cult of personality to the west. It is a dangerous neighborhood and will remain so for some time. As one member of Tashkent’s intelligentsia told me: "Traditional Uzbeks have an acceptance of [authority] … just like the Uzbek family, where the father fills this role. President Karimov is the head of the Uzbek household." Ironically, Karimov could win an election, if he chose to have one.

Uzbekistan is no monolith. Karimov must balance the various internal clans that compete for power and influence. Very few, if any, Americans understand the mechanics of this complex dynamic. One Uzbek official with access to Karimov told me that "domestic politics" is the first thing Karimov considers each morning. The argument can be made that these factors have more influence on Uzbek foreign policy than anything else.

Karimov also balances the two competing visions for Uzbekistan’s foreign policy. Loosely, their supporters break down into the "Americans" and the "Russians." The "Americans" are progressive and seek to be a part of the international community, with all of its responsibilities. The "Russians" pine for the Soviet days, when Moscow provided guidance but not interference. These folks, for example, do not want to see the full convertibility of the Uzbek currency (the som) because they control the exchange rates.

I was in Tashkent in early September when the "Americans" were clearly dormant with little influence. Since 9/11, however, they are ascendant. Witness the Uzbek delegation that came to Washington, D.C., in November, ending their visit with a National Press Club briefing. Beyond their obvious command of American culture and the English language, this trip represented the first time a delegation was empowered to make decisions without checking with Tashkent first.

How can America applaud and encourage these kinds of small victories? In the next month, the United States will send a delegation from the House of Representatives, the Senate, and the State Department to see Uzbekistan (and the region). President Karimov will also no doubt visit Washington, D.C., in the near future. As Americans leaders meet Uzbeks – many for the first time – how should they consider this country called Uzbekistan?

First they should move past the clichés and officially banish an "either-or" approach to foreign policy. We are smart enough to encourage security and human rights as mutually dependent even as we recognize that there are elements of the "authoritarian" government with which we can work.

Religious freedom is the nexus point of this mutual dependency. We should work to help create a new security culture in Uzbekistan…and throughout the region. We should fund a joint education process among military officers, diplomats, and law enforcement officials. Educated with courses, for example, on the relationship between religious freedom and civil society, these emerging leaders could help create sustainable environment for religious freedom based on the rule of law. It might not prevent the next bin Laden, but it would go a long way in preventing the bin Laden after next.

We should promote an exchange of Parliamentary officials between Uzbekistan and the United States. Although the current Uzbek parliament is largely a rubberstamp, it is being reformed. Visits to Capitol Hill by Uzbek lawmakers will create an expectation of what elected bodies do and look like, and it will establish a more informed dialogue of mutual expectations and support.

The U.S. should also place an Army battalion along the Uzbek-Afghan border. Ostensibly there for security purposes, these troops would symbolically signify the U.S. commitment to Uzbekistan and the "Americans" in the Uzbek government, encouraging reform. Their presence would also take away the possibility of the Uzbek government using the threat of an infiltrating IMU (whose commander was killed at Mazar-e-Sharif) as an excuse to violate human rights in the name of national security.

Finally, we must do everything we can to make Uzbekistan’s economy more viable. Although the eventual convertibility of the som will bring instability in the near-term, the introduction of free market forces in Uzbekistan is, I believe, its top national security priority. Additionally, through the IMF and World Bank we must provide a Marshall Plan for Uzbekistan and the region. In Uzbekistan, for example, 50% of the population is under the age of eighteen. The statistics are more staggering in Afghanistan and Pakistan. If the youth do not have options, they will create them.

These steps are not for the faint of heart. And they will take at least a generation. Describing the chances of democracy in Uzbekistan, one senior US official told me in September of 2000: "We’ve got a shot [to make a difference]. It won’t be Norway, but it won’t be Pakistan either…." These recommendations require patience and commitment. They require us to engage Uzbekistan as it is, with clarity, not cliché.

Last updated 12 January 2009