The Two-Sustainable-States Solution

By Dr. Chris Seiple on 29 January 2009

An earlier version of this essay was published January 26 on the National Journal's National Security Blog.

In his January 24 New York Times column, Thomas Friedman warned emphatically that "we're getting perilously close to closing the window on a two-state solution" to the conflict in the Middle East. The recent fighting in Gaza has led many to ask: is there anything the Obama administration can do to revive the prospect of an Israeli state and a Palestinian state ever living peacefully side-by-side?

This question begs two more. First, why is it vital to U.S. national security that a just peace between Israel and Palestine be achieved? The conflict between Israel and Palestine is the primary prism through which the Muslim world views the United States. And that view regards the American role as less than even-handed, providing a recruiting and fund-raising tool for terrorists worldwide. If we remove this prism, then we stand a chance of winning the global war of ideas and preventing the bin Laden-after-next (the next one is already guaranteed). Yes, it is critical to stand with an ally and fellow democracy, and it is important to work for a just solution that serves some 10 million people. But the single greatest thing the U.S. can do for its long-term national security is to have 1.3 billion Muslims see the U.S. play an even-handed, active, and sustained role in creating a peace that is just between the Israeli and Palestinian peoples. If not, more and more Muslim youth, especially Palestinians, will likely channel their frustrations into the global insurgency that al-Qaeda is now fighting against the United States.

Second, what is the essence of a just peace? Complex formulas and tradeoffs over many contested issues have been proposed in prior rounds of negotiations, but the core issue is whether the peace deal results in a Jerusalem that serves both as the state capital of two nations and as a holy home to three religions. Theoretically, the "Two-State Solution" peace process has sought this end-state. Unfortunately, often in the absence of viable partners, the U.S. did not do much these past eight years to enable the process, except to belatedly start the "Annapolis Process" in December 2007. "Annapolis," however, witnessed both an increase in Jewish settlement activity and a decrease of the moderate middle in Palestinian politics and society.

The U.S. and international community has sought a deal for two "states" but there has been insufficient recognition of what a sustainable nation-state is. A "nation" is a group of people with a common identity (usually ethnic). A state is a generally contiguous geographical entity with internationally recognized borders. Israel must become a nation-state if it is to survive as a democracy. If Israel—whose majority population is Jewish—allows for too many Arab-Israelis (Palestinians) within its borders, it is likely that freely elected Palestinians will rule the Jewish nation in less than two generations (given current birth rates).

Sadly, on the other hand, Palestine is barely a nation, and barely a state. Divided within itself—between Gaza's Iran-empowered Hamas and the West Bank's Fatah—the people of Palestine do not speak with one voice about who they are and what they want (even as Hamas and Fatah now try to kill one another). Adding insult to injury, Palestine's geography is not contiguous: instead it is a series of intentionally compartmentalized enclaves that are not economically viable. Thus, the Jewish nation cannot allow for the Palestinian nation within the Israeli state or Jewish democracy will soon cease to exist, even as the Palestinian nation is not one until its leadership unites to oversee a ghettoized geography that is not viable as a state.

So where does this leave the U.S.? First we should acknowledge that the formal peace process known as the "two-state solution" is essentially dead. Second, we should re-affirm our commitment to a just peace that eventually results in two sustainable states, while allowing for the reality on the ground: it will be some time before the Israeli and Palestinian leadership emerges that can consider new ideas and approaches to a just peace. Meanwhile, we should view this current danger as an opportunity.

Third, since everything else has failed, we should allow for the possibility that religion can be a part of the solution (since it is obviously a part of the problem). In "getting to yes," it is critical to see the interests behind the negotiating positions. However, in moving from conflict resolution to conflict transformation it is vital to engage the heart behind the interests. When hearts are engaged, there is a chance for truth-telling, mercy, and healing. While such a process is not singularly faith-based, the deeply devout children of Abraham must be involved. These devout folks are necessarily paradoxical partners: they hold irreconcilable theological beliefs but are also commanded by their faith to work for peace, justice, mercy, and compassion.

This kind of engagement—we call it "relational diplomacy" at our institute—means being ready to speak to all sides. Now, perhaps, it is not (yet) the official role of the U.S. to engage in such diplomacy. It is, however, in the national interest to support such endeavors. Devout people are not constrained by previous positions and interests. They can talk to whomever they wish in the name of practical peace. For example, devout people of faith are not afraid to engage Hamas, Syria, and Iran. These conversations not only provide for real listening and respect across the deepest of differences, this kind of relational diplomacy provides sufficient "plausible deniability" for the various governments to begin to understand the other sides' positions and interests. These kinds of conversations, above all, have the potential to transform hearts and therefore produce a new vision rooted in common values (instead of the usual conflict management that governmental negotiating teams have a difficult time moving past). Call it "track 1.5"—operating at the nexus of "track one" (government) and "track two" (non-government).

Fourth, in similar fashion, the primary role of the U.S. right now should be to establish a new tone and behavior in its interaction with all parties. We must work to ensure that all sides see, hear, and feel respect. Respect-based engagement foremost means an active listening. It is the pre-condition for enabling a new peace process where all sides can begin to figure out a solution for themselves. The process must be about mutual respect if we want the product to reflect the same. As we move forward, it might prove that the new tone and behavior established by the U.S. government would mutually reinforce the "track 1.5" relational diplomacy of devout people.

Fifth, the above points are the foundation for a comprehensive U.S. approach that engages all relevant parties simultaneously. While the U.S. actively listens to Israelis and Palestinians—and as those two parties begin to determine the leadership they need for the post-two-state-solution peace process—the U.S. should also be engaging the surrounding Arab states, being sure that the 2002 Saudi peace initiative is not taken off the table. As it does so, the United States needs to demonstrate respect to the Arab world even as it encourages and engages the emerging dialogue about religious freedom and apostasy in Arab countries. That respect can begin with hiring Muslim-Americans to serve on the U.S. negotiating team for the Israel-Palestine conflict.

Given the current state of affairs, Syria is now the center of gravity to this comprehensive U.S. approach. We should engage Syria with the intent of fostering a peace treaty between Israel and Syria (working with and building upon the good work of Turkey). If an Israel-Syria deal is possible, it weakens Syria's dependence on Iran even as it limits Iran's influence of Hamas. Finally, as much as possible, this comprehensive approach should take place in the context of ongoing international and regional consultation and support. (For more ideas about what a comprehensive approach entails, please see my Summer 2008 article, "Seizing the Middle East Moment," published in The Review of Faith & International Affairs.)

We are at a critical moment, and now is the time for U.S. diplomacy and relational diplomacy's "track 1.5" approach to enable a respect-based engagement rooted in common values and goals.

Last updated 21 April 2009